p192 

.......... et la France bientôt après, perdit encore les quatre vaisseaux qu'avait emmenés le contre-amiral Dumanoir.

Suivant le rapport de cet officier général, la nuit qui suivit le combat de Trafalgar fut employée par ses vaisseaux à réparer, aussi bien que possible, les avaries qu'ils avaient reçues, et il les maintint au vent, pour être prêt à recommencer le combat le lendemain, s'il trouvait lès chances favorables : il ne les jugea point telles, et il prit le large. Les vents et la connaissance qu'il avait d'une escadre stationnée dans les environs du détroit, empêchèrent le contre-amiral Dumanoir de se diriger de ce côté; il. fit route à l'ouest et ensuite au nord. Le 2 novembre, étant arrivé par la latitude du cap Finistère, ses vaisseaux furent observés par deux frégates anglaises  appartenant à l’escadre du commodore sir Richard Strachan, qui croisait dans ces parages pour. intercepter l'escadre de 'Rochefort, alors à le mer, sous les ordres du capitaine Allemand , Ces frégates donnèrent immédiatement avis à leur commodore du voisinage d’une escadre française. Sir Richard Strachan fut bientôt sur ses traces. Le  clair de lune empêcha le contre-amiral de tromper l'ennemi à l'aide  de quelques fausses routes ;  et le 3 au malin les deux escadres étaient en vue et a une distance beaucoup plus rapprochée que la veille. Toute la journée se passa en chasse, et   la nuit suivante le clair de lune favorisa encore l'ennemi dans sa poursuite.

Au point du jour, le 4, l'ennemi, fort de quatre vaisseaux et quatre frégates, n'était plus qu'à trois portées de canon des vaisseaux français. L’amiral Dumanoir, dans l'intention qu'ils se trouvassent en ligne de bataille aussitôt qu'il aurait jugé à propos de les faire virer de bord, avait rangé ses vaisseaux  en ligne d'échiquier ( ordre dans lequel ils présentaient tous la poupe aux ennemis qui les chassaient ). A huit heures deux frégates commencèrent à les harceler, en leur tirant quelques coups de leurs pièces de chasse. Bientôt, la supériorité de leur marche leur permit de venir en travers de temps en temps , et de tirer à chaque fois une ou deux bordées     entières sur les vaisseaux français, qui ne pouvaient riposter que de leurs canons de retraire. Cette manœuvre, dont le résultat fut d'endommager et de dégréer en détail  les vaisseaux français, dura jusqu'à onze heures et demie. A cette heure cependant, le contre-amiral Dumanoir se décida à former sa ligne de bataille . Pendant ce temps, une troisième frégate avait rejoint les deux autres, et avait été suivie de près par trois vaisseaux de ligne. Ces six bâtiments attaquèrent la ligne française de manière a envelopper les deux derniers vaisseaux. Afin de ne pas laisser écraser sa queue, l'amiral Dumanoir  fit virer son escadre vent devant par la contre-marche (successivement). Ce mouvement fit essuyer au Duguay-Trouin tout le feu des trois vaisseaux ennemis, qu'il prolongea à contre-bord, et le plaça un instant dans la même position où s'était trouvé le Scipion , mais le brave capitaine Touffet, après avoir dépassé les vaisseaux de ligne ennemis auxquels il avait vigoureusement riposté, força les trois frégates a s'écarter. Elles laissèrent arriver pour prendre poste sous le vent de la ligne française, qui avait achevé son évolution. Les trois vaisseaux ennemis virèrent alors pour s'établir au même bord que l'escadre française. Le Namur et la Révolutionnaire rallièrent dans ce moment leur escadre: le premier prit poste dans la ligne des vaisseaux et l'autre  fut se placer dans celle des frégates. De la sorte, il s'établit un ordre régulier, dans lequel chaque vaisseau français se trouva avoir, un vaisseau ennemi au vent et une frégate sous le vent. Obligés ainsi de .combattre des deux bords, les vaisseaux français, malgré les avaries qu'ils avaient reçues au combat de Trafalgar, se défendirent avec la plus grande opiniâtreté. Les frégates anglaises ne purent toutefois conserver la  position qu'elles avaient prise par le travers des vaisseaux français, qui les eussent coulées à fond en quelques bordées, mais  France.: elles s'attachèrent a en prendre d'autres qui leur permissent de tirer sur ces vaisseaux sans être exposées à tout leur feu. L’action se prolongeât avec la plus grande vigueur pendant quatre heure et demie ; mais alors elle se termina de la manière la plus lâcheuse : les vaisseaux français amenèrent tous quatre leur pavillon. Le Formidable se rendit le premier, le Scipion céda presque en même .temps, le Mont-Blanc et le Duguay-Trouin succombèrent un quart d'heure après. Ces vaisseaux étaient dans l'état le plus déplorable, presque entièrement démâtés, et avaient de huit a neuf pieds d'eau dans la cale. Les équipages avaient combattu avec une ardeur sans égale, et leur intrépidité méritait d'être mieux récompensée par la fortune . Le nombre des tués et des blessés dans cette affaire malheureuse fournit une nouvelle preuve que nos marins ne se découragent pas facilement, et savent joindre a la bravoure française une opiniâtreté et une constance dans les revers, qu'on .a souvent reproché a notre nation de ne pas posséder au même degré que d'autres peuples : le Formidable eut plus de  200 hommes hors de combat, le Scipion un pareil nombre, le Mont-Blanc 180, et le Duguay-Trouin 15o. Parmi les tués se trouva le brave capitaine Touffet, son second, le capitaine de frégate Boisnard fut grièvement blesse, le capitaine Berrenger  du Scipion, et l'amiral Dumanoir le furent aussi ; mais moins dangereusement. Les Anglais ne portèrent leurs pertes qu'à 135 hommes tués ou blessés. Beaucoup de marins pensent avec nous que les manœuvres du contre-amiral Dumanoir, dans les journées des 2, 3 et 4 novembre, ne furent pas exemptes de blâme. Celte opinion, que nous n'aurions. peut-être pas manifestée si nous l'eussions eue seuls, fut exprimée officiellement par des personnes qui occupaient ou qui avaient occupé les premiers rangs dans le corps de la marine. On reprocha au contre-amiral Dumanoir de n'avoir pas, le 4 au matin, viré de bord pour se porter à  la rencontre de l'ennemi, puisqu'il avait acquis la certitude             d'en être joint (dans ce cas, il n'eût peut-être eu a combattre, pendant assez longtemps, que trois vaisseaux et trois frégates, puisque le Namur et la Révolutionnaire ne rallièrent leur escadre que vers midi); on lui reprocha plus vivement encore d'avoir laissé prendre ses vaisseaux en poupe par des frégates ennemies, qui les harcelèrent de la sorte pendant près de quatre heures,.et durent les avarier dans leur gréement ; enfin, on trouva que le contre-amiral Dumanoir avait marqué trop d'indécision dans-toutes ses manœuvres.

La prise des quatre vaisseaux de l'amiral Dumanoir, qui suivit de si près le combat de Trafalgar, forme le dernier trait de l'affligeant, tableau que nous avons du tracer de ce combat mémorable. Il nous reste a parler de l'impression causée par la nouvelle de ces funestes événements et du sort éprouvé par les divers personnages qui y jouèrent les principaux rôles.              

 Source : Victoires et conquêtes, désastres, revers et guerres civiles des Français, en 27 volumes,  C. L. F. Pancoucke, Editeur, 16 rue et hôtel Serpente, Paris, 1817, par une société de militaires et de gens de lettres, tome 16, p192-196.

 

 

1805

BRITISH AND FRANCO-SPANISH FLEETS

107

..................Having by dark on the day of the battle gained a safe offing, M, Dumanoir commenced repairing the few damages which his squadron had sustained ; few, indeed, for his ships, in making off, carried royals upon a wind, and to the British, who were attentively observing them, exhibited no signs of injury. One or two of the ships, however, were certainly struck in the hull by some of the British ships, most probably by the Minotaur and Spartiate ; for the Formidable made a good deal of water, and had three of her guns dismounted, and the Duguay-Trouin had one petty officer mortally and four others slightly wounded. Upon looking into the rôles d'équipage of the four ships, we cannot discover that they sustained any other loss in the battle of Trafalgar.

With the wind as it blew, the French admiral would have steered towards Toulon, had he not received intelligence that Rear-admiral Louis, with a squadron of four or five sail of the line was cruising in the neighbourhood of the Straits. Nothing

1805

BRITISH AND FRANCO-SPANISH FLEETS

108

 

now remained but to proceed on a cruise, or to endeavour to make a home port to the northward. Fortunately for British interests, M. Dumanoir chose the latter alternative, and, having stood to the westward until the squadron doubled Cape St. Vincent, which it did not do until the 29th, he steered north, intending to enter the road of the isle of Aix.

The celebrated Rochefort squadron of five sail of the line, three frigates, and two brigs, under Rear-admiral Allemand, had escaped from their anchorage since the preceding July, and was now at sea, playing sad havoc with British commerce. Two or three squadrons were seeking M. Allemand, and every British cruiser was on the alert, in the hope of hearing some tidings of him. In the latter part of October the British 18-pounder 36 gun frigate Phoenix, Captain Thomas Baker, steering, with sealed orders, to a prescribed spot, a short distance to the westward of Scilly, received intelligence from two or three neutrals, that the Rochefort squadron had recently been seen in the bay of Biscay. Considering that the importance of this communication would justify him in prematurely breaking open his despatches, Captain Baker did so, and found they merely contained an order to proceed to what was likely to prove to the Phoenix and those on board of her a profitable cruising ground.

Without a moment's hesitation in the choice between private interest and public duty, Captain Baker made all sail towards the bay of Biscay ; and, having crossed it, had just reached the latitude of Cape Finisterre, when, on the 2d of November, at 11 A.M. standing on the starboard tack, with the wind at north-north-west, the Phoenix discovered and chased four large sail, bearing west-north-west. Soon after noon the strangers bore up, under all sail, in chase of the Phoenix ; who thereupon bore up also, and steered south, Captain Baker being aware that a British squadron under Sir Richard Strachan was cruising off Ferrol ; and into whose hands he hoped to be able to lead, what he believed to be, a part of the Rochefort squadron.

At 3 P.M. the Phoenix discovered four additional sail of large ships bearing south. In a quarter of an hour more the four sail first seen, having made the same discovery, hauled to the wind, on the starboard tack. Immediately the Phoenix, then steering south-south-east, hauled up to south by west, the better to keep sight of the ships first seen. These, which were, as it will be conjectured, the French 80-gun ship Formidable, and 74s Mont-Blanc, Scipion, and Duguay-Trouin, under Rear-admiral Dumanoir, * subsequently wore and stood to the eastward ; and the Phoenix, firing guns and covering herself with signals, stood again to the south-south-east, to join the four large sail seen in that direction, and judged, but not yet ascertained, to be friends.

Much about the time that the Phoenix gained a sight of the

1805

SIR RICHARD STRACHAN'S ACTION

109

 

four ships of M. Dumanoir, bearing from her west-north-west, the British 38 gun frigate Boadicea, Captain John Maitland, and 18-pounder 36-gun frigate Dryad, Captain Adam Drummond discovered and chased them in the east by south. At about 8 h. 45 m. P.M. the Phoenix saw the Boadicea and Dryad, but, as the latter were between herself and the supposed Rochefort squadron, the rockets they threw up failed to produce the desired effect, and the Phoenix continued to stand from them. At about 9 h. 30 m. the Boadicea and Dryad discovered to leeward the same four ships, towards which the Phoenix was hastening, together with three others at no great distance from then, making seven sail in all. These were a British squadron under Sir Richard Strachan, which had been detached from the Channel fleet since the 29th of October, in search of the Rochefort squadron, and consisted of the:

Having, without getting any answer to their signals, arrived within two miles of the Cæsar, which was the weathermost ship of this squadron, and then standing close hauled on the larboard tack, the Boadicea and Dryad, at about 10 h. 30 m. P.M., tacked to the north-east, and soon lost sight of friends and foes. At 11 P.M. the Phoenix passed under the stern of the Cæsar, steering as before about north by east ; and, after the receipt of a shot and the interchange of a few hails, discovering the ship to be what she was, Captain Baker informed Sir Richard Strachan that the Rochefort squadron, or four ships at least of it, were then not far distant upon his lee bow.

Sir Richard's squadron being at this time very much scattered, the commodore directed Captain Baker to make sail to the south-south-east and hasten forward the ships astern. The Cæsar then bore away under all sail, with the wind at west-north-west, followed at a great distance by the Hero, Courageux, and Æolus. Scarcely had the Phoenix stood away from the Caesar before the light of the moon discovered to Sir Richard the objects of his chase, then in the east-north-east, under a press of canvass, in the act of bearing away, closely formed in a sort of bow and quarter line. The Caesar and her three nearest consorts continued the pursuit until the setting of the moon, at about 1 h.30 m. A.M. on the 3d, accompanied by hazy blowing weather, concealed the enemy from view ; they then shortened sail, to await the coming up of their friends astern.

At daylight on the 3d, by which time the wind had veered to

1805

BRITISH AND FRANCO-SPANISH FLEETS

110

 

west-south-west, the Santa-Margarita joined the Cæsar and her three companions; and at 7 h. 30 m. A.M. Cape Ortugal appeared in sight, bearing south-east half-east distant 36 miles. At 9 A.M. the French ships again showed themselves in the north-north east ; and the British ships, spreading every thing they could set, immediately chased in that direction. At 11 A.M. the Namur, preceded by the Phoenix, and followed at some distance by a frigate which afterwards proved to be the Révolutionnaire 38, Captain the Honourable Henry Hotham, appeared far astern using every effort to get up. At noon the French ships were about 14 miles distant, and in the same line of bearing as when first seen, the wind south-south-west, blowing strong. Toward 3 P.M. the Santa-Margarita, by her superior sailing, became the leading ship in the chase ; and the Phoenix, upon joining in the evening, was despatched ahead, to assist the former in harassing the enemy's rear. To the great mortification of her officers and crew, the Bellona had by this time parted company.

On the 4th, at daylight, owing to the indifferent sailing of the Formidable, aided by the partial influence of the wind in its fluctuations throughout the night, and which now blew moderately from the south-east, the British ships had gained so far in the chase, that scarcely six miles intervened between the Cæsar, still the leading line-of-battle ship of her squadron, and the Scipion, the rearmost ship in the French line. Such also, during the preceding night's chase, had been the zeal and activity on board the Santa-Margarita, that, by 5 h. 45 m. A.M. this frigate got near enough to fire her starboard foremost guns at the Scipion ; who, in a quarter of an hour afterwards brought her stern-chasers to bear, and presently killed the boatswain, and badly struck the hull, of the Santa-Margarita. At 9 h. 30 m. A.M. the Phoenix got up, and opened a fire from her larboard guns into the Scipion's starboard quarter. In this way the two British frigates, practising every feasible manoeuvre to keep clear of the broadsides of their formidable opponents, continued to harass the French rear. Meanwhile the Cæsar, Hero, and Courageux, now formed in line ahead, and just favoured by a shift of wind to south-south-east, were rapidly approaching, to give a more decided feature to the combat.

At about 11 h. 45 m. A.M., finding an action unavoidable, the French admiral threw out the signal for his ships to take in their small sails, and haul up together on the starboard tack, with their heads to the north-east by east. This they presently did, and then fell into a line ahead in the following order Duguay-Trouin, Formidable, Mont-Blanc, Scipion. From the last-named ship the Cæsar at this time bore about south by west rather more than a mile distant: consequently she was well on the weather quarter of the French rear. The Namur and Révolutionnaire had been great gainers by the slight change in the wind. They were now running with it upon the quarter, and

1805

SIR RICHARD STRACHAN'S ACTION

111

 

bore front the commodore and his line, the one south-west, or nearly astern, distant about 14 miles, the other west-south-west, or a little upon the lee quarter, distant about seven miles. A trifle to the westward of the Révolutionnaire's line of bearing, and just out of gun-shot from the enemy, lay the Æolus ; and, much nearer, the Santa-Margarita and Phoenix, who had already performed so well, and who were still doing their utmost to cripple the rearmost French ship.

Having announced to Captains Gardner and Lee, by hailing, that he should attack the centre and rear of the enemy, Sir Richard edged away for the French admiral ; as did the two former, in like manner, for M. Dumanoir's two seconds astern. At about 15 minutes past noon the Cæsar opened her larboard guns upon the Formidable, then, as well as her three companions, carrying topsails and topgallantsails with courses clewed up, and having the wind, as before, about a point abaft the starboard beam. In a minute or two after the Cæsar had begun firing, the Hero and Courageux, in quick succession, discharged their broadsides into the Mont-Blanc and Scipion. The three French ships instantly returned the fire, and a spirited action ensued. At this time the Namur was about 10 miles astern, using every effort to get up.

At about 50 minutes past noon the Cæsar hoisted the signal for close action. At 10 h. 55 m. P.M. the Duguay-Trouin, gallantly luffed up, with the intention of raking the Cæsar ahead ; but the latter, luffing up also, avoided the salute. This period of the action we have endeavoured to illustrate by the following diagram.

 

Either by accident or design, the Duguay-Trouin went in stays, and, while rapidly passing, on the larboard tack, under the lee, successively, of the Cæsar and Hero, received from each of them, particularly from the latter, which ship she almost touched, a heavy and destructive fire.

The French admiral, in the mean time, having made a signal to that effect tacked to support his gallant second ahead, and was followed in the manoeuvre by the two ships in his wake ; but having had her rigging much disabled by the Cæsar's fire,

1805

BRITISH AND FRANCO-SPANISH FLEETS

112

 

and being at best a bad-working ship, the Formidable could not get round quick enough to regain her station in the line. The latter thereupon became third instead of second : the French ships, when on the larboard tack, ranging as follows : Duguay-Trouin, Mont-Blanc, Formidable, Scipion ; having the wind about half a point before the beam.

At about 1 h. 20 m. P.M. the Cæsar, being too much disabled in her rigging to tack, wore ; but the Hero and, we believe, the Courageux succeeded in tacking. Finding that the Cæsar, after she had got round, was making but slow progress in the chase, Sir Richard, at 1 h. 40 m. P.M., signalled the Namur, then on the weather bow of the French ships, to attack the enemy's van, and at the same time made the Hero's signal to lead on the larboard tack. The Hero, followed at some distance by the Courageux, and at a much greater distance by the Cæsar, edged away towards the French squadron.

About this time, observing that the Namur was lying to, as it appeared ; out of gun-shot of the enemy, the Cæsar, by way of enforcing attention to the signal she had previously made fired at the former ship " two guns shotted. " * Of this fact we were fully, aware when drawing up the account for our first edition ; but, observing, among the official papers in the gazette a " General Memorandum, " communicating Sir Richard Strachan's thanks to his captains for their " zealous and gallant conduct ; ? " We consider that there might have been some mistake in the log-entry, and refrained, upon a principle which we still feel to be just, from making the slightest allusion to it. We have since learnt that the Namur was fired at in the manner stated ; but that Sir Richard, whose impatience, we believe, is not always of the most discriminative kind, subsequently acknowledged that he had been unnecessarily harsh. Even in this view of the case we should perhaps have withheld the statement ; had not our previous omission been attributed to motives incompatible, with the impartiality which gives to these pages their principal value.

At a few minutes before 2 P.M. while running down to close the Formidable, the Hero recommenced the action by firing her starboard guns at the Scipion who, losing in consequence her main topmast, fell to leeward. Here the Scipion was engaged by the Courageux to windward, and by the Phoenix and Revolutionnaire (which latter had just joined) to leeward. The Hero, in the mean time, had got upon the weather beam of the Formidable, and kept gradually forereaching until she gained a station upon the latter ship's larboard bow. At about 2 h. 45 m. P.M. the Namur arrived up astern of the Hero and began engaging the Formidable. The Hero then made sail to close the Mont-Blanc; which ship, as well as the Duguay-Trouin

1805

SIR RICHARD STRACHAN'S ACTION

113

 

had occasionally raked the former while engaging the Formidable.

At 3 h. 5 m. P.M., having had her mizen topmast shot away and her fore topmast and mainmast left in a tottering state, and observing the Cæsar, who had since refitted her damaged rigging in the act of opening her fire, the Formidable hauled down her colours, and was taken possession of by the Namur ; who, having had her main yard cut in two by the French 80-gun ship's fire, was incapacitated from making sail. At 3 h. 10 m. P.M. just as the Duguay-Trouin and Mont-Blanc had bore up, to form a fresh line ahead of the Scipion, the latter ship, having, by the united fire of the Courageux and frigates, had her fore topmast and main and mizen masts shot away, struck her colours, and was taken possession of by the Phoenix and Révolutionnaire.

Seeing the fate of the Scipion and Formidable, the Duguay-Trouin and Mont-Blanc endeavoured to make off ; but they were soon overtaken by the Hero and Cæsar. After a close and well-maintained cannonade of about 20 minutes' duration, in which the British 80-gun ship's heavy broadsides were most sensibly felt, the two French 74s, being reduced to a shattered and defenceless state, and observing the Courageux ready to open her fire, hauled down their colours, the Duguay-Trouin to the Hero, and the Mont-Blanc to the Cæsar. This occurrence took place at about 3 h. 35 m. P.M. ; when the ships of both squadrons were nearly in the positions represented in the following diagram:

 

The Cæsar lost four men killed and 25 wounded ; the Hero, as a proof of the conspicuous part she took in the action, one second lieutenant of marines (Robert Morrison) and nine men killed, one lieutenant (John Shekel), one second lieutenant of

1805

BRITISH AND FRANCO-SPANISH FLEETS

114

 

marines (Cornelius James Stevenson), one purser (Thomas Titterton), and 48 men wounded ; the Courageux, one man killed, her first lieutenant (Robert Clephane), one master's mate (Thomas Daws), one midshipman (John Gibbs Bird), her gunner (John Austin), and nine men wounded ; the Namur, four men killed, one captain of marines (William Clements), one lieutenant (Thomas Osborne), one midshipman (Frederick Beasley), and five men wounded ; the Santa-Margarita, her boatswain (Thomas Edwards), killed, and one man wounded ; the Rêvolutionnaire. two men killed and six wounded ; the Phoenix, two killed and four wounded; and the Æolus, three wounded : making a total of 24 killed and 111 wounded. None of the British ships had any spars shot away, except the Cæsar her main topgallantmast, the Hero her foretopsail yard, and the Namur her main yard ; but the Cæsar and Hero had received considerable damage in their masts generally, as well as in their rigging and sails.

The loss sustained by the French ships was extremely severe. The Formidable had 200 killed and wounded, including among, the latter Rear-admiral Dumanoir in two places ; the Scipion, the same number, including among the wounded her captain ; the Mont-Blanc 180, and the Duguay-Trouin, 150, including among the latter's killed her captain : making a total of 730 in killed and wounded. * All four French ships had been so struck in their masts, that, soon after the action ended, the foremasts of the Formidable and Mont-Blanc were the only sticks left standing. This, coupled with the heavy loss just enumerated, affords a decisive proof that the French ships did not surrender until they were compelled to do so : it proves, also, that the British ships fired their guns, which is not invariably the case, with both quickness and precision.

The force of the four French ships has already appeared (see p. 94) ; but it must in justice be stated, that in this action the Formidable mounted 65 guns only, three having been dismounted in the battle of Trafalgar (see p. 107), and 12 of her quarterdeck 12-pounders having been thrown overboard during the chase of the squadron by Sir Richard Strachan. This fact is stated on oath in the written depositions of the Formidable's late officers, lodged in the admiralty prize-court, and is confirmed by the official return of the prize broker, it there appearing that no more than 68 guns were found on board the ship.

In the battle of Trafalgar, neither the French nor the British frigates fired a shot : in this battle all four British frigates, three of them especially, contributed their full share towards achieving the victory. It is true that the official letter, the extraordinary brevity of which has been so admired by some and blamed by others states that when the French ships tacked " the frigates were to leeward of the enemy. But Sir Richard surely never

1805

SIR RICHARD STRACHAN'S ACTION

115

 

intended to have it thence inferred, that they took no further part in the action. An officer of one of the line-of-battle ships, apparently the Namur, in a letter published on the same day as the official account, considers that the tacking of the French ships " gave the frigates in the rear the credit of taking a good share in the action. " The French indeed represent, that every one of their ships, when the squadron got on the larboard tack, found herself assailed by a ship of the line to windward and a frigate to leeward, the latter placing herself in a comparatively safe but harassing position on the quarter. This is saying too much. What the frigates really did may be thus stated : The Phoenix, by her skilful manoeuvres, decoyed the French squadron within sight of the British squadron. This frigate, then, accompanied by the Santa-Margarita, gallantly fought, and considerably annoyed, the rearmost French ship ; so much so, doubtless, as to have checked the way of all the French ships, and thereby enabled Sir Richard the more quickly to overtake them. When the French squadron tacked, the Santa-Margarita got thrown out, because she had received a dangerous shot in the magazine, besides several other shot in her starboard side ; to stop the holes of which the ship was obliged to be kept on the heel for two hours. But the Santa-Margarita's place was ably supplied by the Rêvolutionnaire, who, with the Phoenix, gave the finishing blow to the Scipion. The Æolus exchanged a few distant shot with the French ships as they passed to windward, and made herself useful in taking possession of the Mont-Blanc after that ship had struck to the Cæsar.

The capture of M. Dumanoir's squadron may fairly be considered as an emanation from the battle of Trafalgar. So that, out of the 18 sail of the line which France possessed on the morning of the 21st of October, in a fortnight afterwards she could count only five, and those five shut up in a Spanish port, helpless to themselves and useless to their country. The news of these sad reverses reached the French emperor in Austria, in the midst of his brilliant triumphs. Napoléon is said to have flown into the most violent rage, and to have declared, in allusion to Byng's fate, that he would teach French admirals how to conquer. " Je saurai bien apprendre aux amiraux français à vaincre. " In a little time, however, Buonaparte's habitual duplicity resumed its sway over his mind ; and he was weak enough to imagine that, because he told the legislative assembly that a few of his ships had been lost in a storm, † and the Moniteur and other French papers refrained from publishing a word on the subject, the world at large were a jot less wise respecting the real fate of the Franco-Spanish fleet.

The French emperor subsequently gave a gracious reception to Captains Lucas, Infernet, Magendie, and Villemadrin; saying to

1805

BRITISH AND FRANCO-SPANISH FLEETS

116

 

the first two: "Those captains who, instead of closing with the enemy, kept out of gun-shot, shall be prosecuted, and if there is cause, shall be made a striking example of ; " "Les capitaines de vaisseau qui, au lieu d'aborder l'ennemi, se sont tenus hors de portée de canon, seront pour-suivis, et, s'il y a lieu, il en sera. fait un exemple éclatant ; " * and to the last two: " You are among those who fought well; you shall have your reward, " " Vous êtes du nombre de ceux qui se sont bien battus, vous prendrez votre revanche. " †

Napoléon's intentions respecting M. Villeneuve are not very clear. This unfortunate admiral, having obtained his parole, sailed from Plymouth in a cartel on the 9th of April, and on the night of the 22d landed at Morlaix ; intending, it was under-stood, to proceed straight to Paris to justify himself before the French emperor. A few evenings afterwards M. Villeneuve, while waiting at the Hotel de la Patrie at Rennes for Napoleon's orders respecting his future movements, was found dead in his bed, stabbed in several places, as alleged, by his own hand, but, as very generally suspected, by the agency of Buonaparte. Buonaparte has since denied this, ‡ but who would confess such an act ? On the 20th of October, 1809, and not before, Rear-admiral Dumanoir, for his conduct on the 21st of October, 1805, was tried by a court of inquiry, which had been summoned by Napoléon's orders, and was acquitted. The court sat at Paris, and was composed of the two senators, the Comtes de Fleurieu and Bougainville, and the two Vice-admirals Thevenard and Rosily ; who gave it as their opinion, " That Rear-admiral Dumanoir manoeuvred conformably to signals and the dictates of duty and honour." " Que le contre-amiral Dumanoir a manoeuvré conformément aux signaux, et à l'impulsion du devoir et de l'honneur. " " That he did all that the wind and circumstances would permit to succour the commander-in-chief. " " Qu'il a fait ce que les vents et les circonstances ont pu lui per-mettre pour venir au secours de 1'amiral. " " That he engaged, as closely as he could, all the ships that he met in his way to the centre. " " Qu'il a combattu, d'aussi près qu'il a pu, tous les vaisseaux qu'il a rencontrés jusqu'au centre. " " In short, that he did not individually abandon the contest until forced to do so by the damages of his ship, and in particular by the impracticability of manoeuvring, owing to the state of his masts and rigging." "Enfin, qu'il n'a personnellement quitté le combat, quo forcé par les avaries de tout genre de son vaisseau, et particulièrement par l'impossibilité de manoeuvrer dans l'état où se trouvait sa mâture."

On the 29th of December, 1809 the same court of inquiry sat to investigate M. Dumanoir's conduct on the battle of the

1805

BRITISH AND FRANCO-SPANISH FLEETS

117

 

5th of November. The members would not question the bravery of a French admiral, but they found fault with his tactics. There was some colour for this ; and the question still lies open, " Why did not M. Dumanoir, on the 4th, or on the day preceding the battle, with his four sail of the line, tack and fall upon the three British sail of the line and three frigates then solely in pursuit of him . Not satisfied with the sentence pronounced upon him, M. Dumanoir demanded and obtained a naval court-martial. It was held at Toulon, and honourably acquitted him. M. Dumanoir is now the fifth vice-admiral on the list. Captains Maistral and Epron outlived Napoléon's displeasure ; and the name of the survivor of the two, Captain Epron, is not eclipsed in honorary marks of distinction by that of any officer of the same rank in the " Etat Général de la Marine."

Sir Richard Strachan carried his four prizes in safety to Plymouth, and they were all added to the British navy ; the Formidable, under the name of Brave, the Duguay-Trouin, under that of Implacable, and the remaining two under their own names. The Implacable and Scipion were the only ships that afterwards went to sea. On the 9th of November, two days before his despatches reached the admiralty, and consequently without reference to his recent success over the enemy, Sir Richard was promoted to the rank of rear-admiral. On the 29th of the ensuing January, Sir Richard, for his conduct in the action of the 5th of November, became invested with the order of the Bath ; and, about the same time, the rear-admiral, and the captains and officers who served under him, received the thanks of parliament. Gold medals were also distributed, and the first lieutenants of the line-of-battle ships, we believe, made commanders.

Source: Naval History of Great Britain 1793 - 1827 by William James published 1837, en 6 volumes, volume IV 1804-1808, p 107-117